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Abstract
This chapter describes a proposed new defined benefit (DB) pension design known as a portfolio pension
plan. This design falls within a larger category of so-called ‘shared risk’ pension plans. In the United
States, shared risk pension plans address a need created by the limitations of existing retirement plan
designs. An alternative to existing designs is needed because DB plans to date have concentrated risk on
plan sponsors in a way that makes them financially unsustainable in many, if not most, circumstances.
Moreover, existing defined contribution (DC) retirement plans impose risk on employees in a way that is
challenging for most individuals to manage. In the past, many employers shared risk with employees by
providing both a DB and a DC plan. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that a new model can provide an
alternative that better serves employers and employees in the United States.
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Chapter 10
The Portfolio Pension Plan: An Alternative
Model for Retirement Security
Richard C. Shea, Robert S. Newman, and Jonathan P. Goldberg

This chapter describes a proposed new deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension
design known as a portfolio pension plan. This design falls within a larger
category of so-called ‘shared risk’ pension plans. In the United States,
shared risk pension plans address a need created by the limitations of
existing retirement plan designs. An alternative is needed because DB
plans to date have concentrated risk on plan sponsors in a way that makes
them ﬁnancially unsustainable in many, if not most, circumstances. Moreover, existing deﬁned contribution (DC) retirement plans impose risk on
employees in a way that is challenging for most individuals to manage. In
the past, many employers shared risk with employees by providing both a DB
and a DC plan.1 Nevertheless, this chapter argues that a new model can
provide an alternative that better serves employers and employees in the
United States.2

The Shared Risk Pension
Shared risk pensions offer a design that is more sustainable for employers
than existing DB plans, yet they also provide greater retirement security for
employees than stand-alone DC plans. Rather than concentrating risk on
either employers or employees, shared risk pension plans (as their name
implies) allocate risk across the parties. Done right, these new designs
promise to allocate risk more efﬁciently, in a way that delivers both greater
sustainability and improved retirement security.
A portfolio pension plan accomplishes this result by allocating a signiﬁcant portion of the investment risk to employees and leaving the remaining
investment risk and the longevity risk with the employer.3 Under this model,
employee beneﬁts are expressed in the form of account balances, which are
adjusted up or down in response to investment performance. At the same
time, the employer guarantees a cumulative minimum rate of return of at
least 0 percent (in effect, a minimum beneﬁt that protects principal) as well
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as retiree payments in the form of life annuities. Above these minimums,
employers are free to allocate more risk to themselves by offering additional
investment guarantees (such as a higher minimum rate of return) or by
subsidizing beneﬁt distributions to employees and their beneﬁciaries.
In contrast to most existing DC plans, the portfolio pension plan does not
require or permit employees to contribute to the plan or to direct their
investments. Instead, the employer makes all contributions (which could be
in lieu of employer contributions to a DC plan), and the plan manages
all investments in employee accounts. Such investment management is
designed to automatically adjust the level of investment risk the employee
bears to his or her changing circumstances over time, in accordance with
modern portfolio theory (hence the name ‘portfolio’ pension plan).
A fundamental principle of the portfolio pension plan is that (1) employees
are not asked to bear investment risk, unless the risk is appropriate to their
individual circumstances, and (2) they are not asked to bear the additional
responsibility of managing the investments in their accounts—a critical
responsibility that most lack the ﬁnancial acumen and time to handle.

Background
In the United States, we have moved from a world in which most signiﬁcant
retirement risks were borne by employers offering DB plans, to a world in
which DC-covered employees must bear these risks largely on their own.4 Yet
the conventional assumption that an employer who provides access to a
retirement plan must assume either all or none of the signiﬁcant risks
associated with retirement beneﬁts has become dysfunctional. Speciﬁcally,
many employers have concluded that they are no longer willing or able to
bear the risks associated with providing retirement beneﬁts through DB
plans.5 Nevertheless, many individuals are ill-equipped to assume those
risks on their own, as they must in DC plans.6 As a result, employers face
fewer options to move individuals reliably from active employment to retirement, just as employees are becoming increasingly pessimistic about their
ability to provide for a secure retirement on their own.7

Risk allocation in traditional DB pensions
The traditional DB plan promises workers that the employer will provide a
speciﬁed level of retirement income beneﬁt. Accordingly, an employer’s
funding obligations to the plan hinge on how well the plan’s assets perform
in the investment markets.8 In turn, the DB plan’s investment experience
depends on two factors: actual investment performance to date, and
expected investment performance in the future.
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To reﬂect expected future investment performance, and to ensure that
the plan has sufﬁcient assets to provide promised beneﬁts, ﬁnancial
accounting and regulatory funding rules, in effect, require the plan’s promised beneﬁts to be discounted to the present using an interest rate reﬂective
of future risk-adjusted investment expectations.9 Changes in the investment
environment thus affect not only past investment performance reﬂected in
the value of plan assets, but also expectations about future investment
performance reﬂected in the interest rate used to discount promised beneﬁts to present value. As a result, changes in the investment environment
cause important shifts in the spread between the value of the plan’s assets
and the present value of its promised beneﬁts. When the present value of
beneﬁts exceeds the value of plan assets, the plan is underfunded, and the
employer is expected to make up the shortfall (sooner or later). Here we
refer to the risk that plan asset values will not keep up with the present value
of promised beneﬁts as ‘investment’ risk.
Furthermore, when beneﬁts are promised for the lifetime of retirees, the
liabilities of the plan depend on how long the retirees are anticipated to live.
The risk that retirees might live longer than expected is known as ‘longevity’
risk. In a DB plan, this risk is measured at the plan level over the entire plan
population, rather than at the level of the individual retiree.
Investment risk can cause substantial swings in employers’ funding obligations, as plan assets and plan beneﬁts are periodically revalued and
compared to one another. Longevity risk tends to be perceived as slower
to change, absent major unexpected improvements in cohort life expectancy. Under US regulation, DB plan ﬁnancial accounting and regulatory
funding rules generally require the value of plan assets and plan beneﬁts to
be remeasured and compared annually, and thereafter reﬂected in the
company’s ﬁnancial statements and regulatory funding requirements. The
potential for dramatic swings in these obligations (stemming largely from
investment risk) has led many employers to reduce their exposure to traditional DB plans. As a result, DC plans have become the design alternative
most employers turn to.

Risk allocation in DC plans
DC plans, and especially participant-directed pensions such as 401(k) plans,
place both investment and longevity risks squarely on employees’ shoulders as
individuals. The retirement income individuals receive from these types of
plans depends on several factors. First, employees may fail to contribute, or
save enough. Second, after contributions are made, individuals’ investment
choices determine returns earned on the savings over the work life, which
generate the assets used to provide retirement payouts. Third, the timing of
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retirement can signiﬁcantly affect the value of individuals’ DC accumulations.
A disability or early retirement, for example, can curtail individuals’ ability to
save as well as to time retirement to favorable market conditions.
Fourth, retirees must also manage their accounts to provide retirement
income for their own and perhaps their partner’s lifetime. Not knowing how
long one is going to live poses a challenge difﬁcult for any one individual (or
couple) to bear. Whereas the DB model pools longevity risk across the
employee and retiree group, the DC plan does not offer protection against
such longevity risk.
While many people may be able to determine their own retirement plans,
risk tolerance, and health conditions, investment expertise is not widespread.
Indeed many individuals would ﬁnd it challenging to assume the investment
risk of managing their own retirement savings, and the longevity risk of
planning retirement distributions over their own unpredictable lifespans.10

Reducing Risk by Sharing it
Plan design options that better share risk between employers and employees
would enhance the retirement system in the US for several reasons. First,
such options offer a middle ground between the polar extremes of allocating all signiﬁcant risks to either employers or employees. Second, while
many employers may not wish to bear all the risks imposed on them by
traditional DB plans, they may still be willing and able to bear some of those
risks. Third, employees may be willing to share investment risk with employers in a way that would relieve the plan sponsor of dramatic swings in
ﬁnancial liability. For instance, an employer could still guarantee some
minimum retirement beneﬁt, giving participants the chance to share in
investment upside returns with reduced risk on the downside. Additionally,
the investment risk could be professionally managed and tailored to workers’ investment horizons and tolerance for risk. This would obviate the need
for each participant to develop investment expertise.
Fourth, such risk sharing would permit diversiﬁcation across a large group
by having employers retain it, sharing it collectively among participants, or
some combination of these two approaches. And ﬁfth, by allocating each risk
to the party best able to bear or diversify it (i.e. to the least cost avoider—see
Coase 1960; Calabresi 1970) in a way that minimizes moral hazard and adverse
selection, risk sharing would enhance the retirement system’s efﬁciency.

The Portfolio Pension Plan
The Portfolio Pension Plan (‘PPP’) is a DB plan modeled on the cash
balance plan design. A cash balance plan is a DB plan that promises a
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beneﬁt based on the balance in a hypothetical account. Each year, a participant’s account is credited with an amount typically based on the participant’s pay (while the participant remains employed), and the balance in the
account is credited with interest (regardless of whether the employee
remains employed), typically at a rate based on the current yield on US
Treasuries. In contrast, each employee’s account balance in a PPP is
adjusted over time based on the return on an investment portfolio tailored
to the employee’s expressed preferences and changing circumstances.
The PPP has many characteristics in common with a conventional cash
balance plan. It is ﬁnanced solely by the employer, and over the work life,
each employee’s balance is credited during employment with pay credits
(typically a percentage of current pay). Each participant’s accrued beneﬁt is
expressed as an account balance. Like a conventional cash balance plan, a
PPP provides employees with a minimum guaranteed beneﬁt which is
generally equal to the cumulative pay credits in the employee’s account
accrued over his or her career (or it can be higher, if the employer wishes to
provide a more generous guarantee).11 Additionally, the plan offers at least
actuarially equivalent annuities for employees and surviving spouses; and
the plan sponsor is permitted to subsidize beneﬁt distributions, to provide,
for example, in joint and survivor annuities, disability beneﬁts, death beneﬁts, and plant closing and lay-off beneﬁts. (For this purpose, a subsidized
beneﬁt means a beneﬁt that has a greater actuarial value than the employee’s current account balance.)
The deﬁning feature of the PPP, and where it differs from a conventional
cash balance plan, is how it credits earnings to the notional account balance
(‘interest credits’ in conventional cash balance plans). A conventional cash
balance plan provides ‘interest credits’ which adjust the account for the time
value of money until the employee begins receiving beneﬁts under the plan.
In a conventional cash balance plan, a single rate is credited for all participants, usually the current yield on a speciﬁed government security, such as
30-year Treasury bonds. In a PPP, by contrast, each individual’s account
balance adjusts based on the return his or her individually-tailored retirement investment portfolio earns. This rate therefore reﬂects and adjusts to
employees’ changing circumstances over time.
As a result, employees will likely earn different returns on their accounts.
For example, an employee could be placed in a cohort with other participants of like age and risk tolerance. This cohort would then start with an ageand risk-appropriate diversiﬁed portfolio that adjusts automatically over
time, akin to a properly designed target date fund. As the employees
approach retirement, their investment allocations would change accordingly. Taking this approach a step further, the PPP could employ an individual managed account approach, which takes into account additional
variables speciﬁc to the employee, such as other retirement beneﬁts,
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non-retirement assets, health condition, marital status, expressed risk tolerance, intended retirement date or work phase-down period, and so on. This
investment mix could adjust to reﬂect changes in these variables over time.
PPP investments are professionally and automatically managed, so the PPP
does not rely on participant direction or education to achieve a balanced
portfolio. Although individuals do not bear the burden of allocating investments, they can improve the ﬁt of their investment portfolio to their individual circumstances by voluntarily providing additional information of the
types just described.
The PPP also allocates risks between employers and individuals that could
advantage both parties. Participants still bear investment risk, but the PPP
tailors the level of risk to participants’ individual circumstances. Furthermore, the PPP gives participants the ability to participate in the upside
potential from taking on investment risk, while still enjoying a minimum
beneﬁt guaranteed by employers. And in turn, employers can invest in
instruments to hedge against the minimum beneﬁt, so funding volatility
from the investment risk employers still retain would be minimized. More
importantly, the investment risk and associated funding volatility for
employers from sponsoring a PPP would be a tiny fraction of that they
currently experience from sponsoring a traditional DB plan, or even a
conventional cash balance plan.
Because the PPP plan offers an annuity beneﬁt, employers continue to
bear longevity risk. Nevertheless, we believe that the sponsor may be in a
better position to assume longevity risk than individual participants. The
sponsor can spread the risk across its workforce and retirees, and the plan
might have the opportunity to invest in instruments that hedge against
changes in mortality (meaning payments are made to the plan if plan
participants receiving life annuities live longer than expected). The arrangement also enhances retirement security by avoiding the need for individual
retirees to manage distributions and investments based on guesses about
their own and partner longevity.12

Conclusion
Traditional ‘all or nothing’ approaches to allocating risks can be intelligently rethought. Doing so offers the potential for improving retirement
outcomes for both employers and participants, in ways that have seemed
impossible under traditional DB and DC plan designs. The portfolio pension plan adapts principles of both DC and DB pensions, seeking to rebalance the allocation of risks in a fresh approach to future retirement plan
design.
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Endnotes
1. The past approach of providing employees both a DB and a DC plan no longer
works in the growing number of instances where employers have frozen or
terminated their DB plans. See GAO 2008: 1–4 (stating that plan sponsors terminated over 61,000 sufﬁciently funded DB plans between 1990 and 2006 and that
an estimated 3.3 million active participants are affected by plan freezes).
2. The pension plan design described in this chapter was ﬁrst presented in Feb. 2012
at a conference in Washington, DC, hosted by the United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions and co-sponsored by the Pension
Rights Center, the Urban Institute, and Covington & Burling LLP. The conference brought together senior policymakers from seven federal agencies, six
Congressional committees, state and local governments, labor unions, employers,
think tanks, retiree advocacy organizations, trade associations, professional actuarial organizations, and academia, as well as members of the press who cover
retirement issues. The focus of the conference was on innovative pension plan
designs to share and reduce risk, enhance coverage and adequacy, and expand
lifetime income options. Excerpts from the conference are available online at
<http://www.pensionrights.org/what-we-do/events/re-imagining-pensions>.
Several of the designs presented at the conference (including the one described
in this chapter) have been incorporated into subsequent legislative proposals and
regulations. See, for example, 79 Fed. Reg. 56451 & 56463 (Sept. 19, 2014) (ﬁnal
Treasury regulations on hybrid retirement plans).
3. We note that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA 1974) gives
plan sponsors discretion to establish the actuarial assumptions used to convert
employee account balances into annuities, including the ability to specify variable mortality assumptions that are updated periodically to reﬂect improvements in mortality. To the extent that the plan sponsor takes advantage of the
discretion to use such variable mortality assumptions, employees could be said
to bear the portion of longevity risk attributable to mortality improvements in
the general population (as opposed to the portion of longevity risk attributable
to the employee’s own actual life span and, if relevant, that of his or her
surviving spouse).
4. This shift is seen most dramatically in the replacement of the traditional DB plan
by the participant-directed DC plan, as the predominant form of retirement
arrangement. See Gale et al. (2005). This chapter focuses principally on taxqualiﬁed retirement plans maintained by private employers in the US. We note,
however, that this trend has characterized other nations as well. See Broadbent
et al. (2006) at 11–17 (discussing the general shift throughout the OECD from DB
to DC plans, with particular emphasis on Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US).
5. Plan sponsors cited the cost of plan contributions (72 percent) and the volatility of
plan funding (69 percent) as the primary reasons for freezing DB plans (GAO
2008: 6–7).
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6. ‘The shift away from DB plans to DC plans places signiﬁcant responsibility on
individuals to make appropriate decisions concerning their contributions, their
investments and how they will manage their money once they retire so that they
will have adequate income to fund their retirement years. Unfortunately, many
individuals are simply not prepared to handle these risks and responsibilities’
(American Association of Retirement Persons 2011: 59).
7. The shift from DB to DC plans has had some positive effects in the labor market:
traditional DB plans tend to be heavily backloaded economically, whereas DC
plans (and other account-based plans like cash balance plans) tend to provide
economically level beneﬁt accruals over an employee’s work life (Gale et al.
2005: 53). As a result, many workers fail to accrue signiﬁcant beneﬁts under a
traditional DB model, because they do not remain in their jobs with the DB plan
sponsor long enough. By contrast, DC plans (and other account-based plans like
cash balance plans) penalize job changing less. The Employee Beneﬁt Research
Institute suggests that, as a result of the DB/DC shift, average vested beneﬁts
have increased for employees covered by employer-sponsored retirement plans,
concluding that vesting rates rose from 24 percent in 1979 to 43 percent in 2012
(Copeland 2013: 1, 3).
8. Conventional cash balance plans (such as those modeled on IRS Notice 96–8,
1996–1 C.B. 359) behave similarly to traditional DB plans in this regard, even
though they express retirement beneﬁts in terms of an account balance as
opposed to a deferred annuity.
9. See Elliott (2009). For ERISA minimum funding purposes, discount rate based
on investment grade corporate bond yield curve, see 26 U.S.C. § 430(h).
10. See n. 5 of this chapter. We do not wish to minimize the considerable strides
made recently permitting plan sponsors to structure DC plans as increasingly
comprehensive retirement vehicles. Such strides include the advent of participant education and advice, auto-enrollment, auto-escalation, insurance to
replace contributions lost due to disability, qualiﬁed default investment alternatives, target date funds, individual managed accounts, coordination with Social
Security beneﬁts, and various investment management services and insurance
products designed to manage investments and payouts (including lifetime
income payouts) in retirement. See American Association of Retirement
Persons (2009: 115–16 (listing series of improvements to deﬁned contribution
system subsequent to the Pension Protection Act of 2006, P.L. 109–280, 120
Stat. 780).
11. See 26 U.S.C § 411(b)(5)(B)(i)(I)&(II) (cash balance plan is required to provide a minimum guaranteed rate of return of at least 0 percent cumulatively and
is permitted to provide a more generous ‘reasonable minimum guaranteed rate
of return’); see also 26 C.F.R. 1.411(b)(5)-1(d)(2)&(6) (same).
12. One could also imagine that the PPP approach would offer continued investment management services throughout retirement, including the management
of payouts to the employee, coordination with payouts from Social Security and
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other sources of retirement income, continued exposure to the market to some
degree, and the provision of ‘so-called’ longevity annuities, which would start
when the retiree reached some pre-speciﬁed advanced age (e.g. 85).
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